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PRESCRIPTION
Joseph Dainow*
AcQuIsrrIvE PRESCRIPTION
Possession as Owner
In Poole v. Continental Can Co.' the successful plaintiff had
good record title to the property in dispute, and the defendant's
plea of acquisitive prescription was dismissed because "the only
act of possession was the cutting of the timber in 1966.' '2 It is,
of course, necessary to examine the question of adequacy of
possession in the particular facts of each case (and there may
well have been other circumstances here), but there is no dis-
cussion or citation of authorities, and it would be regrettable
if in later decisions this case were cited as authority for the
proposition quoted above.
LiEmATmvE PRESCRIPTION
Starting Point for the Running of Time
Prather v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.2 presented a question de
novo and on first reading appears to reach a fair and just result.
On more careful examination, a number of points warrant further
inquiry. A rice combine was purchased in November, 1967, but
delivery was not made until February, 1968. A redhibitory action
(for latent defects) was instituted in January, 1969. Civil Code
article 2534 provides: "The redhibitory action must be instituted
within a year, at the farthest, commencing from the date of the
sale," but the court held that in this case the prescription did
not start to run until the date of delivery. The court found sup-
port in the Planiol treatise on the French civil law and in the
general principle of contra non valentem agere non currit prae-
scriptio,4 and while both of these approaches are highly com-
mendable, their application in the present case is open to, ques-
tion.
On the first issue, it must be pointed out that the corre-
sponding provision in the French Civil Code, article 1648, differs
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 232 So.2d 832 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
2. Id. at 833.
3. 232 So.2d 80 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 234 So.2d 195 (La.
1970).
4. Prescription does not run against one who cannot act.
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substantially from ours in its statement: "The action resulting
from redhibitory vices must be instituted by the buyer, within
a short time, according to the nature of the redhibitory vices,
and the custom of the place where the sale has been made."
Planiol's discussion about the discretionary power thereby vested
in the judge appears inappropriate as authority for the interpre-
tation of our codal provision which stipulates a fixed maximum
period and an expressly stated starting point.
More intensive investigation into the sources of our own
code text reveals very distinct Spanish and Roman influences
on the point in question. The Moreau-Lislet and Carleton 1820
publication of The Laws of Las Siete Partidas Which Are Still
in Force in the State of Louisiana shows a fixed prescriptive
period in the Spanish law (6 months for redhibition; one year
for reduction of price) with an express starting point on the day
of the sale.5 Especially significant is a footnote concerning the
prescriptive period for a reduction of price: "The time of one
year is reduced to six months by the Civil Code [La. 1808], art.
75, p. 358."0 With the Partidas text stating that the period runs
from the day of the sale, the footnote is "C. art. 75 and 77, p.
358."7 Other Spanish and Roman authorities likewise contain a
fixed prescriptive period with express provision for it to count
from the day of the sale.8 For the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825,
the Commissioners stated: "This section is remoulded entirely,
and although the principles contained in it remain the same,
and there are few additional provisions, yet we think that the
matter is here presented with more order and clearness.", In
the process, the six month period of the redhibitory action was
changed to one year' O and that text has been carried forward
into our present Civil Code.
With reference to the court's second ground of decision in
the general principle of contra non valentem, it is open to ques-
tion whether this general principle is applicable contra legem
where there is an express and specific legislative rule as in our
Civil Code article 2534.
5. LAS SmaTs PARTIDAS bk. 5, tit. 5, 1. 65 at 707 (Moreau-Lislet & Carleton
transl. (1820)).
6. Id. at 707 n. (b).
7. Id. at 708 n. (1).
8. FEBRERO, LIBRERIA DE ESCRIBANOS 2.7.1.56 (1789); Curia Philipica no. 26 at
316 (also identical with LA. Civ. CODE art. 2534, par. 2); DIGEST 21.1.19(6).
9. PROJET OF CIV. CODE or 1825, 1 LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES 308 (1937).
10. Id, at 310.
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On the basic policy issue concerning the period for bringing
the redhibitory action, the protection of the purchaser against
latent defects is counterbalanced not only by the protection of
the vendor against uncertainty in his affairs but also by the
interest of society in the stabilization of transactions. Under both
the French and Spanish laws, there is the basic idea that this
period should be short, and in the present case the difference
between 13 months after the sale and 11 months after the delivery
hardly seems to support an interpretation contra legem.
Another aspect of the prescription against the redhibitory
action is brought out in Mid-City Finance Co. v. Coleman"
which held that the period starts to run from the moment the
vendor abandons his attempts to repair the defects. This matter
was well discussed in the earlier case of Brown v. Dauzat12 and
in previous symposium comments's to the effect that the attempt
to make repairs is an acknowledgment of responsibility and
therefore constitutes an interruption of the prescription.
MINERAL RIGHTS
George W. Hardy, III*
Tim LANDOWNER'S RIGHTS IN MINERALS
Unauthorized Removal of Minerals
White v. Phillips Petroleum Co.' is to be noted by a student
in a later issue. However, this writer desires to express the
view that the decision should be read with extreme care and
limited to its specific facts. The case raises the question of the
right of a landowner to recover for unauthorized removal of
minerals. Without delving into details, it is safe to say that the
law recognizes at least two remedies for such conduct: one in
delict under which damages are measured by the value of the
thing taken and the other in quasi-contract for the amount by
which the defendant has been enriched as a result of the taking.2
Early cases also applied the old "theory of the case" doctrine
11. 232 So.2d 918 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
12. 157 So.2d 570 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
13. The Work of the Louisiana AppelZate Courts for the 1963-1964 Term-
Prescript,on, 25 LA. L. REv. 352, 358-59 (1965).
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1. 232 So.2d 83 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
2. Liles v. Producers Oil Co., 155 La. 385, 99 So. 339 (1924); Liles v. Barn-
hart, 152 La. 419, 93 So. 490 (1922); Martin v. Texas Co., 150 La. 556, 90 So.
922 (1921).
